Protests have rocked Iran since the September 16 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in police custody, three days after she was 逮捕了 by the morality police in Tehran for allegedly violating the Islamic Republic’s strict dress code for women. There were reports that officers battered the Kurdish woman with a baton; the police claimed she suffered a heart attack.

More than 200 protestors have reportedly been killed by security forces during the fierce government crackdown, and hundreds of women and girls—often removing and burning their hijabs in defiance of the authorities—have been 逮捕了. The protests have continued across Iran despite efforts to 拘留 not just the protestors but also men and teenage boys, 和伊朗的公众人物, who have expressed their support; meanwhile, rallies in the United States and Europe have proclaimed international solidarity with the demonstrators, 谁经常喊“女人?, 生活, 自由,” and “death to the dictator” (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei).

Natana DeLong-Bas, an associate professor of the practice in the Theology Department, speaks with University Communications Associate Director Phil Gloudemans about the current Iranian protest movement and the context for the government’s repression. The past president of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, she is an expert on Islam and Christianity, 比较《电子游戏软件》, 妇女与性别, 伊斯兰律法, 环境, 极端主义, 和阿拉伯海湾国家.


Natana DeLong-Bas

Natana DeLong-Bas: (Lee Pellegrini)

Iran has had a number of significant uprisings, including the revolution that brought the Islamic Republic into power in 1979; the 2009 Green Movement to protest massive fraud in presidential elections; the 2019 uprising over rising gasoline prices, and now the protests that erupted since the death of Mahsa Amini. What is new or different about today’s demonstrations compared to the past?

第一个, there are no clerics involved and the protests are neither religious nor anti-religious in nature. 宗教一直小心翼翼地, 我是有意为之, 被排除在外, even though the issue that sparked the current demonstrations—an assault on a woman for “improper” veiling—is understood to be a reflection of the state’s religious commitment. 抗议活动的焦点是“女性”, 生活, 自由,” all of which are interconnected in protesting a totalitarian regime. A major aspect of these protests has been the centrality and visibility of women—as victims and as voices—claiming the right to personal autonomy. 最后, 不像过去, 今天正在进行的抗议, 从示威到静坐, are leaderless and seem to be organic and spontaneous, 但影响深远, 可见性和共振.

The majority of the protesters seem to be under the age of 25. Iranian sources indicate that the average age is 15, and the women who have died at the regime’s hands range from ages 16 to 22. Other than their youth, what defines these protestors?

What is so poignant about these protests is the fact that so many of the victims—those killed, 逮捕了, 被拘留的人都很年轻. Protest images frequently highlight young girls and young women, apparently of high school and university age, stripping off and setting fire to their veils, 剪他们的头发, as demonstrations of their claims to personal autonomy. Children as young as 10 are seen carrying posters and placards, demonstrating their support for the protesters. These young people literally represent the country’s future, and they are taking charge of their destiny even though they are too young to have government representation.

In a country where culture is largely rooted in obedience to age and power, and submission of individual to collective identity, the fact that so many young people are banding together as an alternative collectivity sends a strong message about the refusal to abide by rulings they have had no voice in legislating. Rather than accepting powerlessness in favor of the powerful, these youth are finding ways to make their voices heard. The question that remains is not just whether anyone is listening, but whether any alternative outlets for fulfilling youth demands and the desire for a stake in determining Iran’s future will be offered outside of joining with existing powers in policing and denouncing others.

How would you characterize the chances that today’s protest movement will result in some significant, long-lasting changes to the Iranian government’s rule?

The issue of a “proper” hajib has proven to be the match that’s lit the ticking time bomb of a population frustrated with a regime that not only fails to meet people’s expectations, but is also mired in a mindset that doesn’t resonate with large portions of the citizenry dissatisfied with the unnecessary restrictions on their personal autonomy and 生活 choices—everything from clothing and personal appearance to the 自由 to attend soccer matches. Those who protest are not necessarily demanding the overthrow of the government; instead, they are insisting that the regime hear their voices and grievances. 如果有一个转折点, it will be if and when the state’s arms of violence—the police, 军事, 法院也质疑他们的命令, which is already transpiring among some members of the Basiji (morality police) since Mahsa Amini’s death, who have expressed distress with directives to fulfill arrest quotas for “improperly” dressed young people or who appear in “morally questionable” ways in public places. If the state’s enforcement mechanisms refuse to carry out draconian measures, 尤其是针对伊朗青年, 它可能引发真正的变革.

Even as Iran has restricted and slowed Internet access to blunt dissent, alternative forms of civil disobedience have emerged. 总统易卜拉欣·莱希, an ultraconservative cleric who insists on hajib rule enforcement, has accused the protestors of misusing Amini’s death to destabilize the country.  你对他的主张怎么看, and do you anticipate any short- or long-term changes by Raisi to quell the unrest?

Blaming social media and youthful impulsivity for creating social unrest, rather than scrutinizing long-standing and widespread frustration with repression, and the limited 自由 of expression, has been the regime’s standard tactic to deny the legitimacy of popular demands. Accusations of destabilization tend to lead to criminal charges of treason, 煽动叛乱, 甚至恐怖主义, resulting in more draconian regime responses, as we are seeing now with sham trials that conclude with death sentences.

None of that is helpful in terms of addressing the issues that have led to so much unrest. Use of civil disobedience is nothing new in Iran; Iranians have long proven to be creative in expression of grievances, 挫折, and pointing to the absurdities of daily 生活 restrictions in nonviolent ways. But peaceful protests only last so long when no tangible results are produced. While nothing is inevitable because human choice is always involved in decision-making, the lack of positive government response increases the likelihood of turns to violence, and responding to it with more hostility. 在这种情况下,没有人是赢家.  

The Biden administration has condemned Iran’s brutality and subjugation of its citizens, 并实施制裁.  Will those measures decrease or end the violence?  如果不是, are there any external forces that could sufficiently influence the Iranian government to ease the conservative Islamic dress and behavior rules that have governed daily 生活 for Iranians since the 1979 revolution?

Regime brutality against protesters is increasing over time and is a serious concern, particularly because many of those who have been killed and violently 逮捕了 and 拘留ed are children—a show of control by a regime desperate to hold onto its power through repression and hostility against its own people. The regime clearly expects its iron-fist rule to stir fear and quell the protests, but the government is missing the protesters’ points: Their desire for personal 自由s and autonomy is greater than their fear of the regime; that there is power in numbers; and that they will continue to express their defiance.

I don’t see the violence or the protests coming to an end without some form of resolution, and that solution needs to come from within Iran on the basis of what the Iranian people want for themselves. The most important support external powers can provide is to back the Iranian people by assuring that any measures undertaken to apply pressure to the Iranian government do not have a negative impact on the general population, which is already under tremendous economic stress.

Clashes between Iranian security forces and protesters were reported in Saqqez, 阿米尼的家乡, after crowds gathered near her grave on October 26 to mark the 40-day mourning period observed under Islamic tradition since her death.  Will this religious milestone end the protests? 如果不是, what can be expected to follow?  

A number of analysts have noted that this 40-day marker could have brought an end to mourning specific to Amini, but the clashes that resulted made it clear that the government persists in repressing any expression of human emotion, thereby ruling out any possibility of an end to the protests. The reality is that many people have been killed during these demonstrations, and the 40-day mourning clock starts anew with each death. If the government wants an end to protests of regime killings, the regime needs to stop killing people. Any government that demonstrates ongoing willingness to arrest, 拘留, and kill its own children and youth cannot reasonably expect the population to be obedient to it. The moral conscience of any human being demands respect for the 生活 and dignity of children.